

The Common Property Resource Digest

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This issue's CPR Forum examines an area of recent discussion and disagreement within the IASCP: what relationship, should CPR scholars and practitioners have with large development agencies and multilateral lending institutions? The IASCP Board recently addressed this question when they were asked to appoint an official IASCP representative to a World Bank program. Their decision is outlined by Bonnie McCay in the "From the President" section on page 14.

The Digest decided that this would be a timely topic for a Forum. Rather than following our standard format of a lead statement and responses, we asked four knowledgeable people to respond to the following: How would you characterize the impacts of multilateral development banks on common pool resources, and what response is called for by CPR management scholars and practitioners? *Frances Korten* begins by asking the fundamental and telling question of whether or not hard currency loans to poor countries are really such a good idea. *Peter Riggs* looks at the implications for the IASCP of the World Bank's interest in CPRs in the midst of all the other new ideas used by people to "leverage" and be leveraged by the Bank. *Lars Soeftestad* responds from the perspective of one who is trying to increase sensitivity to CPR issues within the World Bank. In his eyes, the development community is a fast changing place and last year's useful assumptions may be this year's dogmas. Finally, *Dana Clark* reports on the World Bank Inspection Panel, an effort to reform the Bank.

We are also very excited to introduce a new section to the Digest that we hope will become a regular feature. This is the **Practitioner's Profile** in which we take a look at a particular CPR management program. We use an interview format to learn about the program's successes and challenges and ask what lessons they have learned that may be of use to others dealing with CPR management. **Enjoy!**

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CPR FORUM COMMENTARY

Foreign Loans and Common Property Resources: Why I Cried All the Way to the Bank

Frances F. Korten
The Positive Futures Network

In 1978, shortly after I had arrived in the Philippines as a program officer for the Ford Foundation, I attended a seminar about the decline of the mangrove trees that grow along the country's many coastlines. The government was subsidizing prawn farms because of the foreign exchange the country could earn by exporting prawns to Japan. The prawn farms, however, were destroying the mangroves. Everyone at the seminar recognized the critical "nursery" function the mangrove trees play in maintaining the common fish stocks on which coastal fisherfolk are dependent for their livelihoods. Yet the ultimate argument for the subsidy program was: "We need the foreign exchange."

Over my 15 years with the Ford Foundation in Southeast Asia, the phrase "but we need the foreign exchange" continued to haunt me. I

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heard it as a justification for the destructive logging practices that exacerbated the country's floods and droughts; I heard it in defense of mining operations that sent tons of poisonous mine tailings down rivers and streams to rice fields and fragile coral reefs. I heard it in support of large scale resorts that walled off access to beaches for people who had used them for decades or centuries.

I also heard the need for foreign exchange cited as a justification for loans from the multilateral banks — even for projects that required very little foreign exchange. I vividly recall a discussion with an Indonesian friend who consulted for BAPANAS, the Indonesian national planning agency. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) planned a giant \$120 million loan to improve small village irrigation systems in three provinces in Indonesia's outer islands. My friend had studied farmer managed irrigation systems and cared deeply about the community traditions those systems represent. So, I inquired, how could he approve of a loan that so far exceeded any possibility for effective implementation and would likely undermine the long-standing community traditions in those provinces? Hadn't he seen the damage that an ADB loan was already doing to the traditional irrigation systems (subaks) in Bali? He sighed. "Yes, I know all that. But we need the foreign exchange."

How ironic that a loan — which has to be repaid in foreign exchange — could be seen as a solution to a foreign exchange problem. Irrigation systems have been built for centuries with local labor and materials; the ADB-financed project required little in the way of foreign

imports. But the funds were not be used directly for the implementation of the irrigation project; rather they would be used to repay previous loans and provide the country hard currency for other kinds of imports — including luxury goods in the country's burgeoning shopping malls. The new loan, of course, only postponed the foreign exchange problem, creating a bigger repayment obligation. The context looked to me very similar to that created by the "company store" or the village money-lender — where borrowers are never able to completely repay their loans and slip ever deeper in debt and ever more fully under the control of the lender.

When the World Bank was created at Bretton Woods in 1944, it was to be called the International Bank for Reconstruction and was intended as a facility to help Europe rebuild after the war. I once spoke to a man who represented Mexico at that historic meeting. He told me he had been among those who insisted that the word "development" be added the Bank's name, to make sure that the developing countries were not completely left out. So the new bank became the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD — now commonly called the World Bank).

When the U.S. Congress was asked to approve of the two new institutions, Republicans objected to using the Bank to help Europe rebuild. They reasoned, if the U.S. were to make loans to Europe, when it came time to repay, Europe would have to export more goods to the U.S. than the U.S. exported to Europe. Otherwise the Europeans would not have the extra dollars to repay the loans. The Republicans didn't want the U.S. to have a trade deficit with Europe. They did, however, want to prevent Europe from falling prey to the communists or to another World War II level conflagration. The answer was the Marshall Plan — a program based primarily on grants, not loans.

The Marshall Plan left the IBRD without a job. But fortunately there was that word "development" in its name. So Bank officials turned their attention to the developing countries. Of course the Republicans' logic still held. When loans are made Malawi and Indonesia and Brazil in Dollars and Deutsch Mark and Yen, then, when it comes time to repay, the Americans, the Germans, and the Japanese should expect to import more from Malawi, Indonesia, and Brazil than they export to them. Otherwise the borrowing countries cannot repay their loans. Since the developing countries rarely achieve a trade surplus with the "hard currency" countries, they actually can't repay.

In 1970 the long-term foreign exchange debt of the developing countries was a mere \$70 billion. It now stands at more than \$2 trillion. Does anyone expect that the rich countries whose currencies are used in these loans would deliberately allow their economies to sustain a \$2 trillion trade deficit with the developing world? The loans create a trap from which the developing countries cannot escape.

Yet even though the developing world cannot actually repay its debts, our international institutions demand that they try. To generate the needed foreign exchange, the governments of each of the indebted countries is required to put in place policies that colonize ever more of their own natural resources and productive capacity to serve the countries whose foreign exchange they borrowed. When those efforts are still insufficient (as they nearly always are), our international institutions force them to take more loans, which only postpones the day of reckoning.

All of us who have worked on common property resource issues in the developing world have horror stories about the devastating effects of a loan from one of the development banks on the abilities of local people to manage their fisheries, their irrigation systems, their forests, their grazing lands, etc. We may also know of an occasional loan — or some specific projects within a loan — that have done some good. I have come to feel, however, that regardless of the good or bad of the specific projects funded by the loans, the greater damage lies in the fundamental economic dynamics created by hard currency loans.

There are many pressures that undermine healthy traditions of common property management. I don't dismiss the greed of the power elites, the inevitable march of progress and change, nor the need to move beyond constraining traditions as people raise their hopes for a better life. The problem with the foreign exchange loans, however, is the unrelenting pressure they cause for taking steps that undermine the long-term interests of local people and the natural resources on which they depend. In the quest to generate foreign exchange, time and again people with great understanding and the best of intentions endorse actions that they know full-well are damaging to what they consider good.

So what can we, as Common Property Resource scholars and practitioners, do? My recommendations: Look for the underlying dynamics that drive the damage that you see. Ask the hard questions. I once asked an ADB loan officer — a very nice and capable person — how the Philippines would repay the community forestry

loan he was developing. "I don't know," he replied. "That's not my department." If the answers don't satisfy you, dig deeper. Write about these problems, speak up. Be wary of entanglements that would in any way curtail the honesty of your inquiry.

My own understanding and analysis has meant that I have moved beyond my natural desire to reform the banks. For me, helping them emphasize sustainable development, become more gender sensitive, or learn to work in a participatory fashion is simply insufficient. The world for which I am working — a world based on justice, sustainability, and compassion — simply does not have a place for institutions whose fundamental function is to deepen the foreign currency indebtedness of the developing world.

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CPR FORUM COMMENTARY

Multilateral Development Banks and the Commons

Peter Riggs
Rockerfeller Brothers Fund

The major issue here is “mission creep.” In programmatic terms, the multilateral development bank’s (MDB) rhetorical shift toward “sustainable development” has been accompanied by an ever-expanding notion of its own mandate--both the variety of the partners with whom the Bank engages, and the multiplicity of tasks it wishes to take on.

Private foundations are one of the new-style partners with which the MDBs, and the World Bank in particular, has wanted to engage. When Jim Wolfensohn came to the World Bank, he started to reach out to foundations with international program interests, and particularly to those foundations which

in the past had supported the work of some of the Bank’s NGO critics. As this charm offensive got underway, some of our NGO colleagues were, I think understandably concerned that Mr. Wolfensohn’s intention was to dissuade foundations from making grants in this area, but that has not proven to be the case.

Instead, many foundations, the Rockerfeller Brothers Fund (RBF) included, thought in terms of both lobbying and leveraging the Bank. “Leverage” is an article of faith in the foundation community, basically a recognition that this sector’s resources are comparatively modest, and that the best foundation programs will ultimately “leverage” support from either bilateral or multilateral donors for an expansion of the program. This thinking pervades the foundation community.

The RBF had hoped to “leverage” World Bank interest in IASCP, as a means of getting issues of the commons, and community-based natural resource management, firmly onto the agenda of the MDBs. Seeing IASCP as a source of real intellectual capital, we had hoped that a productive relationship between IASCP and the Bank could be worked out.

At the same time, the RBF was “leveraged against.” Last year, the RBF made a grant to the World Bank for a conference held at the Bank on Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). Rockefeller Brothers Fund has been involved with community-based natural resource management concerns in Asia for many years; we’ve funded research, advocacy, and training on resource tenure, on administrative decentralization, and on coastal management, and we’ve had a strong advocacy

engagement with the MDBs, so naturally our officers felt it important to contribute to the Bank’s emerging interest in CBNRM.

The conference created quite a buzz in the CBNRM community. But the conference also demonstrated the problem of mission creep and the



Sawmill in a Central American forest. Photo Courtesy Randy Poet

pitfalls of trying to “leverage” an agenda at the Bank, because only two people from the operational side of the Bank showed up. Others were just too busy and anyway these weren’t billable hours--no one was buying out staff time to attend the conference. We were left with the impression that the Bank considered CBNRM as a key to many of its rural development projects, that it was happy to host a conference on the subject, which it did so quite skillfully--but that it did not know, in operational terms, how to incorporate this perspective into a loan portfolio. At a more micro-level, it’s not even clear how individual task managers might approach CBNRM issues in the field. Because of the Bank’s mission creep, task managers have faced an inexorable and unsustainable accretion of performance requirements; CBNRM

would have to get in line behind participatory appraisal, gender sensitivity training, and micro-finance in the queue of issues which the Bank knows it must incorporate into its programs, but for which it has no natural comparative advantage.

That buzz in the CBNRM community generated by the Bank's conference--that buzz is the mixture of excitement and dread that comes from having the World Bank discover your particular interest area. The Bank's cyclical discovery of emerging issues like CBNRM is very quickly cast in operational terms--in a way which is removed from the analytical and contextual traditions within which the issue was nurtured. Members of the IASCP, however, deal with free-rider problems as a research question in and of itself. Consequently, in the Bank's overtures to IASCP, which it must be acknowledged the RBF welcomed and encouraged, IASCP sniffed out an intellectual free-rider problem par excellence, and consequently the organization has taken a nuanced approach to its engagement with the Bank. Undeterred, the Bank's interest in CBNRM and commons issue problems is now facilitated through its own newsletter, the Bank's CPR Network, and a parallel network.

Ultimately this concept of leverage gets us all in trouble. Foundations and the MDBs should support and/or carry out those tasks which are intrinsically worth doing, and for which they have core competencies, without getting ensnared in notions of leverage. Indeed, the World Bank's reinvigoration will not come not through an expansion, but rather a consolidation, of its mandate. What would happen, then, to the Bank's discovery of CBNRM and the "question of the commons"? Our original and naive hope was that the Bank would simply find a way to draw upon the expertise found in the membership of IASCP for use in its loan programs, and that IASCP members would assist in the Bank in dealing with the site-specificity and complexity which so often eludes the institution. For operational reasons--the Bank is primarily a bank, IASCP is primarily an academic research body--this remains an unlikely partnership, but the mutual recognition of comparative advantage is at least theoretically possible. As we all know, however, there are strong countervailing currents within the Bank--in particular, the rush toward privatization of commons as a means to increase economic efficiency--in which case, a strong lobbying and advocacy effort from IASCP members directed at the Bank and its programs is the more appropriate response. As a past Digest article noted in a different context, we are all still caught on the horns of this dilemma.

CPR FORUM COMMENTARY

CPRs and MDBs: A Contradiction in Terms?

Lars T. Soeftestad
Anthropologist, World Bank
Coordinator, Common Property Resource Management Network (CPRNet)

Understanding the Issue

This Forum addresses common pool resources (CPRs) as positioned within an increasingly global context. The announcement for the 2000 Conference enthusiastically intones: Common property institutions will be a prominent feature in the next millennium! But with continuity in change, there is also change in continuity. Thus, it continues, traditional common property institutions will need to adjust and change "in response to an ever-expanding global economy", while new commons will be created, and "market institutions may exist side-by-side with common property and governmental institutions". This speaks to the complexities following the current parallel global tendencies to devolve authority and decision-making to both local and supra-national levels, at the cost of the traditional nation-state, all of it taking place within the framework of an increasing globalization of trade and markets.

But what does growing complexity mean? Defining any analytical framework for CPR work is fraught with obstacles, but I would give my vote to political ecology, which is based on the recognition that "... it is not enough to focus on local cultural dynamics or international exchange relations, ..." alone (Greenberg and Park 1994:8). We need to understand how these interact, in terms of relationships between policy, politics and political economy, and over time.

The Changing Development Scene

The development scene is changing rapidly. The situation is becoming increasingly complex, partly because an increasing number of categories of stakeholders are getting involved, and partly because the nature of the relationships between them is becoming complex. At the same time the relationship alluded to in the question is only one facet of the overall picture, which is much more complex.

First, the number of categories of players active today, not to mention the actual number of active stakehold-

ers, is impressive. Second, the content of the relationships between these stakeholders are changing, from simple to complex two-way causalities, and consist to a large extent of strategic information. The traditional picture of local people, governments, bilateral agencies and MDBs is becoming increasingly complex with the growth of NGOs that represent local people or specific local or global interests. Southern governments are becoming differentiated themselves as developing country ministries and line agencies vie for funds. Northern governments are progressively prone to use aid for narrow political purposes or to support the domestic private sector.

By far the most important factor, however, is the private sector. Aided by liberalization moves and increased emphasis on international trade, the private sector has mushroomed, and is increasingly determining of the investment climate between the North and South and the global aid framework. The total investment by the private sector in developing countries is staggering, 13-14 times the World Bank's annual investment. While the World Bank has policies that guide its investment operations, the private sector does not have such guidelines. Because of this governments often prefer to collaborate with the private sector as in the case of the Three Gorges hydro-power project in China

Among MDBs, the World Bank clearly has a major impact on CPRs globally, by virtue of being a major source of funding for development. What to do about this? There are two possible avenues to follow. The first avenue would be to reform the World Bank from the outside. A good example is the Sardar Sarovar (Narmada) project in India, which led to the decision to review the whole resettlement portfolio. However, this is a slow process, and the results are not necessarily convincing.

The second avenue would be to reform the World Bank from the inside. This approach is increasingly chosen by various stakeholder groups, including both NGOs and the private sector. NGOs that earlier decried the World Bank's policies from the outside only, today engage the World Bank from the inside and also collaborate on a wide range of activities and issues. This mode of operation has become de facto Realpolitik for large segments of the NGO sector. In this they also learn to appreciate the many constraints that determine the World Bank's *modus operandi*.

Some World Bank supported work is worthy of criticism and some of it is good and innovative. An increasing number of projects are addressing CPRs.

Three examples will serve to illustrate this: (i) Bangladesh – As a result of a long-standing involvement in fisheries management the elements of a process whereby local fishermen are achieving de facto use rights to water bodies are gradually getting in place (amounting to turning a state property regime over to local management on a lease basis), and will, guided by an overall co-management model, hopefully result in establishing local common property regimes); (ii) Ghana – The stakeholder consultation process devised for recent sector work on coastal zone management was decentralized in order to give voice to local and regional chiefs, which led to the recognition by the Government that the chieftaincy system could play an important role in devising and implementing an overall management plan for the coastal zone; and, (iii) Policy and knowledge management – CPRNet is a good case in point, as is the training work on Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM).

The World Bank is changing. It was, for years, alone in advocating stringent social development guidelines for its investment operations. Such guidelines have been emulated by regional development banks, OECD and some bilateral agencies. Global standards for regulatory frameworks for investment operations that affect local peoples' lives negatively are emerging.

What Could IASCP's Role Be?

The present time would seem to be a turning point for IASCP. The organization is consolidated, the membership is steady, and the conferences attract more and more people. At the same time there appear to be a generational shift in the leadership as well as in the general membership body. At recent conferences I have sensed an increasing undercurrent that questions accepted wisdom and dogma (cf. e.g. Carlsson 1997). IASCP may consider reviewing the past situation, its role and its emphasis, in order to prepare for the future. This would seem to be a necessary exercise in order to positioning IASCP optimally for addressing the common issues of the next millennium.

This review might consider IASCP's past interactions with the World Bank and with CPRNet. An earlier IASCP board sent a letter through Fikret Berkes to the Bank to explore developing a relationship and it received a positive response prepared by myself on behalf of the Bank. IASCP was a partner on the bank-sponsored workshop on Community-Based Natural Resource Management in 1998. The IASCP also established a liaison role with CPRNet the same year.

CPR FORUM COMMENTARY

The World Bank Inspection Panel: Promoting Accountability at a Reluctant Institution

Dana Clark
Center for International Environmental Law

The World Bank Inspection Panel was created in 1993, as a result of the ongoing efforts of an international coalition of NGOs to transform the World Bank into a transparent and accountable

sustainable development organization. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, many ill-designed and controversial projects, such as the Polonoroeste road project in Brazil, the transmigration project in Indonesia, and the Sardar Sarovar dam on India's Narmada River, mobilized international NGOs and donor countries to begin challenging the Bank's way of doing business. The international Bank

We need research on CPRs. However, what we need more is research on how to use and implement – in a sustainable way – the knowledge we already have. That is, the knowledge of CPRs themselves, as well as knowledge on how to integrate, adjust or change them within the increasingly important regional and global frameworks. I am convinced that IASCP could play a crucial role in an emerging global CPR network as a go-between, mediator and translator.

Next Steps

The issue of the proposed collaboration between IASCP and CPRNet [Editors note: see the related "From the President" message in the announcement section.] is an example of the need for creating an emerging global CPR alliance. We need to think of how such relationships can be managed towards increasing the flow of information and, thus, the ability to act, be it on the policy or applied level, or on the local or global level. Towards this, I propose the following combined applied research and networking agendas, involving collaboration between a broad range of stakeholders:

1. A research project on the institutional roles of all stakeholders concerned with CPRs.

The point of departure would be the recognition that stakeholders have roles which are different but complementary. The applied goal of the project would be to propose ways in which collaboration between the key stakeholders could be defined and structured to create synergies.

2. The 2000 Conference, with its theme "Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millennium," would seem to be a suitable occasion to be introspective, draw lessons and look forward to the next millennium.

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Detailed information about CPRNet is available on the IASCP website. The monthly CPRNet Newsletter, sent electronically to members, carries much relevant information. The website for the May 1998 international workshop on CBNRM is at: <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/conatrem/index.htm>



Fish smoking in Africa. Two common pool resources meet.

reform campaign reflected a growing awareness that tax dollars from donor countries were supporting projects in borrowing countries that had significant, adverse effects on the local and global environment, and that seemed to exacerbate rather than alleviate poverty.

The Sardar Sarovar project provides important context for the reform movement that led to the creation of the Inspection Panel. The Bank-supported dam and irrigation project on India's Narmada River would affect over 200,000 people and have devastating environmental impacts. A grassroots uprising against the dam was supported by national and international NGOs. Human rights observers documented the devastating social consequences of the project. In response, the Bank commissioned the first-ever independent review of a Bank-financed project.

The review team, which became known as the Morse Commission after its Chairman Bradford Morse, published its findings in June 1992. The Morse Commission Report meticulously documented clear and routine violations of Bank policies on environmental impact assessment and involuntary resettlement, and the devastating human and environmental costs of those policy violations. The Morse Commission's findings that the Bank largely disregarded its social and environmental policies and tolerated the borrower's violations of the policies, were soon confirmed more generally by an internal review of Bank projects. The Narmada policy violations were not an aberration, but a systemic part of the Bank's culture.

The devastating internal report, authored by Bank Vice President Willi Wapenhans, criticized the Bank's pervasive "culture of approval," in which the incentive structure encouraged staff to perceive the appraisal process as merely a "marketing device for securing loan approval." This culture led to projects based on financial considerations, without adequate attention to the social and environmental implications. In essence, the failure of the Bank to ensure compliance with its environmental and social policies meant that the promise of sustainable development was being sacrificed to the expedience of moving money through the pipeline.

One of the most important reforms during the late 1980s and early 1990s was the development of a set of environmental and social policies that at improving the environmental, human rights and citizen participation record of the Bank. These included policies to ensure environmental assessment, protection of the rights and interests of indigenous peoples, public access to information, and appropriate compensation for local people who are forcibly resettled by Bank-financed projects.

These policies provided the rules for the transition of Bank activities toward sustainable development. The rules represented a new bargain between donor and borrower governments. In the future, money would be available not for old-style development, but for development that was based on environmental protection, respect for human rights, local participation, and broader transparency. These new policies set the conditions by which donor countries could expect future Bank projects to be designed and implemented.

Although taken together the policies were an important step toward sustainable development, implementation of the policies depended entirely on self-policing, with no independent oversight. The Bank's "culture of approval" encourages staff to process loans quickly and move large amounts of money without adequate concern for the quality of implementation or the extent to which the projects are in compliance with Bank policies. Policies that were supposed to ensure social and environmental sustainability have in many cases been routinely ignored by Bank staff, and the policies seemed to have little or no significant impact on improving the environmental and social profile of the Bank's overall portfolio. This lack of impact of Bank policies was starkly highlighted in the findings of the Morse Commission report.

Spurred on by the international NGO reform campaign and the emerging global consensus for sustainable development, member country governments called on the Bank to develop a transparent system of accountability, to ensure that public funds were spent more consistently with the Bank's mandate of sustainable development and poverty alleviation. In response, in 1993 the Bank's Board of Directors passed an improved access-to-information policy and created the independent inspection panel.

The Inspection Panel is an innovative forum for those people most directly affected by World Bank projects to raise their concerns at the highest levels of the Bank. Project-affected people can bring a claim to the Inspection Panel asking for an independent analysis of the Bank's role in the project, and the extent to which the Bank has complied with its own policies and procedures. The claimants must be directly and adversely affected by the Bank's alleged policy violations. The Panel is by definition an avenue of last resort, to be used when the staff of the Bank have been unresponsive to the concerns of the affected people.

The Inspection Panel embodies a unique approach to increasing accountability at an international institution, in that it places the power to initiate oversight in the hands of citizens, often living and working at the project level. As a result, the Panel has the potential to bridge the gap between top-level decisionmakers at the World Bank and the people who actually feel the impacts of those decisions. By amplifying the voices of project-affected people, the Panel offers the Bank a critical avenue for moving toward a more sustainable development model and

provides a surprisingly wide range of related benefits at every level of the institution from the Board of Directors on down to affected communities.

Unfortunately, the accumulating lessons of the cases brought to the Panel indicate that the Bank is continuing to routinely violate certain policies. For example, nearly every claim has emphasized a failure of the Bank to follow its policy on project supervision. This policy is fundamental to the Bank's ability to transform itself to a sustainable development organization, because the components of the projects most frequently ignored are precisely those that mark the difference between development as it was practiced in the past and sustainable development. In short, social and environmental planning and mitigation have frequently not been implemented. Violations of Bank policies designed to protect local people and their environment.

Ultimately, the Panel should be evaluated according to its ability to improve the lives of the affected peoples that have taken the difficult step to file a claim in the first place. The filing of most of the claims has had an immediate positive impact on the plight of local communities, because the threat of independent oversight has led the Bank staff and the entities responsible for project implementation to improve their operations at least temporarily. Unfortunately, long-term improvements in the communities seem to be less certain because as soon as the threat of transparent outside oversight is gone, the projects revert back to many of the pre-existing problems.

More disturbingly, there seems to be little improvement to the Bank's internal commitment to compliance with its social and environmental policies. In June 1999 the Bank approved the China Western Poverty Reduction Project (CWPRP), which critics contended violated Bank policies on information disclosure, environmental assessment, indigenous peoples, resettlement, consultation and participation, agricultural pest management, and more. It also provided institutional and financial support for the Chinese government's controversial policy of population transfer into Tibetan areas. In promoting the CWPRP, Bank Management acted precisely in the manner noted in the 1992 Wapenhans report: marketing the project via the appraisal process. Rather than responding substantively to concerns or critiques, Management spun the numbers, designed a fancy overhead presentation and rushed the project to approval in order to meet a tight lending deadline that was set to close at the end of the month. The bor-

rower, China, also exerted tremendous political pressure on the donor country governments and senior Bank management to approve the project. As a result, the project was approved despite very obvious flaws. Concerned NGOs have filed claim to the Inspection Panel in hopes of some accountability. However, approval of this project demonstrates that as the Bank prepares to enter a new century, it is still an institution with insufficient commitment to project quality or policy compliance. The lessons of Narmada have not been learned, and local people around the world continue to pay the price.

References:

For further information, visit the International Financial Institutions section of CIEL's web page at www.econet.apc.org/ciel/

PRACTITIONER'S PROFILE

Our first Practitioner's Profile is of the Fishermen and Scientists Research Society based in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. We asked Patricia King, the project manager of FSRS, to share with us some of the history and lessons learned by the project.

What does your program do?

The Fishermen and Scientists Research Society (FSRS), a non-profit organization, is an active partnership between fishermen and scientists, developed with the overall objective to establish and maintain a network of trained fishing industry personnel to collect information relevant to the long-term sustainability of the marine fishing industry in the Atlantic Region, as well as to facilitate and promote effective communication between fishermen, scientists, and the general public. This involves: the participation of fishermen in the stock assessment process; enhancing the stock assessment process by making available information that only the fishermen can obtain on a daily basis; developing a better understanding of the others in the FSRS; and participation of fishermen in the development of a sound information base to contribute to more effective resource management.

It is important to note that the members have clearly stated that the FSRS is not, and never will be, a lobby group representing the interests of either the fishing industry or the scientific community.

Currently the membership consists of 198 members, including 156 fishermen members and 42 scientists and other members. Fishermen members include fishermen from a variety of gear sectors and fisheries, including mobile and fixed gear, and groundfish, lobster, and shrimp fisheries. Scientists members have been sourced from both the government and academic communities, as well as from the private sector, and include both natural and social scientists.

The original intention in the first year was to implement a project to collect catch and effort, oceanographic and spawning information for groundfish species. The enthusiasm of members quickly took the FSRS well beyond the original data collection goal. By the end of the first year, members were collecting information not only on groundfish, but also for lobster, pelagic species, and shrimp. Since then, we have taken on a number of other projects, many of which involve the volunteer efforts of members, as well as contract work for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), and Joint Projects with DFO and other organizations/initiatives. Examples include: Identifying and charting sensitive groundfish habitats on the Scotian Shelf and the Inshore Tagging Project for cod, haddock, and halibut



An FSRS meeting. Photo courtesy Patricia King

How did you get started?

In February 1993 a one month pilot project designed to: a) examine stock assessment controversies and obtain a more accurate indicator of the health of the fish stocks, and b) to determine the viability of future interaction and co-operation between scientists and fishermen in the areas of (i) increased participation of fishermen in the stock assessment process, and (ii) their input into the development of a sound information base, with more effective resource management as its key objective. Participants in this project, which included a series of meetings between the fishermen and scientists, expressed a need for the continuation and expansion of this joint venture project; a partnership was deemed to be desirable. .

The pilot project also revealed a relatively untapped source of information and data collection which, if fully utilized, would be a valuable asset to many, including scientists, management and advisory groups, etc., for stock assessment and rebuilding

initiatives. It also identified a number of projects which could contribute to improved stock assessment and resource management.

The current crisis in the fishery has brought a number of issues to the forefront, not the least of which is the need for better communication and co-operation between the various participants in this vital industry. This is necessary if we are to ensure the long-term sustainability of our fisheries resource. The FSRS promotes a partnership which is achieving this goal.

How is your group funded?

Funding for the implementation of the FSRS was provided by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), Human Resource Development Canada (HRDC), the COOPERATION Agreement on Sustainable Economic Development (SEDA), and the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA). On-going financial support is generated through a variety of avenues, including: Joint Project Agreements with DFO; funding through government programs, such as the Science and Technology Youth Internship Program through DFO/HRDC; and revenue generated through contract work.

What have been your most important accomplishments?

The progress made in building trust between fishermen and scientists has been one of our biggest accomplishments. Changing attitudes between these two historically adversarial groups is not an easy or quick process, however, as the two work more and more together they are learning to speak a common language and have developed a better understanding of each other.

The increased degree of involvement of fishermen in fisheries science is another major accomplishment. Fishermen have been involved in all stages of the process, from developing the hypothesis, to designing the projects and protocols, to collecting the data. This participatory approach builds trust, not only between the fishermen and the scientists, but also of the results.

What have been your biggest hurdles or challenges?

While building trust between fishermen and scientists has been one of our major accomplishments, it has also been one of the greatest challenges. Changing attitudes is never easy, particularly under the stresses the industry currently faces with the state of the resources. Lack of funding to support all the initiatives we want to undertake has also been a problem, particularly in light of on-going cuts to government programs.

What lessons have you learned that would be useful for other groups or communities involved in common pool resource management?

Timely feedback to the participants is essential. They need to see the results of their efforts to stay motivated and supportive. Direct communication is essential. This was proven for the FSRS when our funding was cut after the first year and we could no longer afford to have Community Technicians on staff. These were the individuals who worked at wharf-side with the fishermen, collecting samples and data, reviewing results with fishermen, etc. Without this direct contact, we saw a loss of enthusiasm and participation in projects. Fortunately, we have been able to secure new funding in the last year to re-instate the Community Technician positions, and the resulting increase in participation has been obvious, with the membership actually expanding.

What would you like to learn from or about the experiences of other CPR groups?

Regardless of the CPR group, there are common challenges that need to be faced, including building trust, motivating volunteers, finding funding, etc. I would like to learn how other groups have dealt with these difficulties. I would also be interested in finding out about other CPR groups with a similar focus to ours (ie: fisheries science) and what projects they have undertaken and how they have done them. From their experiences, FSRS members may identify new projects they want to do and new ways to do things.

How can readers get in touch with you?

Fishermen and Scientists Research Society
PO Box 25125

Halifax, Nova Scotia Canada B3M 4H4
Phone: 902-876-1160; Fax: 902-876-1320;
E-mail: nstn1582@fox.nstn.ca

People can stay up to date on the activities of the FSRS through our newsletter, *Hook, Line and Thinker*; to receive a complimentary subscription contact the Project Manager, Patricia King, via one of the above methods.

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Compiled by Charlotte Hess

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

From the President:

The Executive Board of the IASCP decided at its June 8-9, 1999 meeting not to support the request that Erling Berge serve on the Advisory Committee of CPRNet as the representative of IASCP. Members of the Board applaud CPRNet and its editor, Lars Soefstestad, for the high quality and unquestionable value of CPRNet. We look forward to future issues and activities and as individual scholars and practitioners many of us wish to participate. However, we feel that a formal relationship between IASCP and a program of a major funding agency is inappropriate, given the strong differences of opinion about such a relationship within our membership. Members from developing countries are among those deeply troubled by the past history of loss of CPRs and CPR institutions due to activities promoted or financed by the World

Bank and other lending institutions. This decision was not easy to make. We recognize the value of CPRNet and related activities within the World Bank as well as changes in bank policy. If at some future time these changes are recognized as significant in helping communities deal with CPR problems, we certainly would be among the thankful millions.

Bonnie McCay

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CONSTITUTING THE COMMONS:

Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millennium

The Eighth IASCP Conference

Bloomington, Indiana, USA

May 31-June 4, 2000

In the April 1999 issue of the Common Property Resource Digest, we presented the general conference themes. The conference will look at the traditional and the new commons.

Conference Program Committee: The following scholars have accepted our invitation to serve on the Conference Program Committee:

Clark Gibson, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana;

Susan Hanna, The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics, and the Environment, Washington, D.C.;

Charlotte Hess, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University;

Minoti Chakravarty-Kaul, Lady Shri Ram College for Women, New Delhi, India;

Ruth Meinzen Dick, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.;

Calvin Nhira, International Development Research Center, Regional Office South Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa;

Susan Stonich, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara, California;

Cristian Vallejos, Forest Stewardship Council, A.C., Oaxaca, Mexico;

James Walker, Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.;

Lini Wollenberg, Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor Barat, Indonesia.

Paper and panel proposals deadline: We invite anyone interested in the new and the old commons to participate in the conference. We encourage scholars and practitioners to submit panel, individual paper, and poster proposals early. The panel, paper, and poster abstracts not to exceed 500 words should be submitted to the Program Co-Chairs at the latest by October 30,

1999. Paper and panel proposals will be reviewed by the co-chairs and at least one other member of the program committee.

Workshops: On Wednesday, May 31, the day prior to the official opening of the conference, we will organize a set of half-day workshops focused on various research approaches and methodologies for the analysis of common-property regimes and common-pool resources. In case the interest for the workshops exceeds our space limitations, we will be able to offer selected workshops on the field-trip day also. With the help of specialized research centers, we have organized the following workshops: *Participatory Rural Appraisal* Bob Fisher, Regional Community Forestry Training Center, Kasetsart University, Thailand; *Experimental Economics* James Walker, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, and the Department of Economics, Indiana University, USA; *Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems* Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change, Indiana University, USA;

A Review of the Common Property Literature over the last 15 years James Thomson, Associates in Rural Development, USA; Victoria Edwards, Faculty of the Environment, University of Portsmouth, UK; Nathalie Steins, Produktschap Vis Afdeling Natuur & Milieu, Rijswijk, Netherlands. We are in the process of organizing several other workshops.

Pressing Concerns of Various World Regions: We propose to organize several panels around concerns that are especially pressing in some world regions. We feel it would be helpful to synthesize regional findings across panels. We plan to

dedicate special time to the discussion of the need for regionalization of the International Association for the Study of Common Property and its research focus. We would like to encourage anyone interested in fostering regional issues in a form of an organized panel or a roundtable to contact the conference co-chairs.

A Note for Publishers: We invite all publishers, who are interested in exhibiting their books at the conference, to contact our conference book-exhibit coordinator, Laura Wisen lwisen@indiana.edu (812) 855-8672 (mailing address below).

Nives Dolsak Elinor Ostrom Co-Chairs
email: iascp00@indiana.edu
Indiana University
513 North Park Ave.
Bloomington, Indiana 47405

Forest Communities in the Third Millennium:

Linking Research, Business and Policy
Towards a Sustainable NTFP Sector
First International Conference on NTFPs in Cold Temperate and Boreal Forests, October 1-4, 1999
Kenora, Ontario, Canada See website for more information web.uvic.ca/ntfp or contact: Iain Davidson-Hunt, The Taiga Institute for Land, Culture and Economy, 300-120 Second St. S. Kenora, Ontario, Canada P9N 1E9 tel. 807-468-9607 fax. 807-468-4893 e-mail taiga-institute@voyageur.ca

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