

The Common Property Resource Digest

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This issue's CPR Forum features papers from the **African Floodplain and Wetlands Project (AFWeP)** conference held in February 2005. African floodplain wetlands provide important Common Pool Resources (CPRs) for Africans in a variety of diverse regions. But nearly all of the CPRs discussed, including pastures, wetlands, and fisheries, suffer from conflicts and degradation. An introduction into the group's theoretical framework by *Tobias Haller* opens the Forum. *Sabrina Beeler* and *Karin Frei* then follow with an outline the institutional setting of fisheries activities in the Niger Inland Delta of Mali. Next, *Gilbert Fokou* and *Gabriela Landolt* highlight the impact of "democracy" on Cameroon's Logone Floodplain. This is followed by a paper on Tanzania's Ujamaa Policy and its effect on common pool resources by *Gimabge Mbeyale* and *Patrick Merok*. *Tobias Haller* and *Sonja Merten* then present a description of the opening up of Common Pool Resources in Zambia. Botswana's Okavango Delta, presented by *Roland Saum*, provides a refreshing case where common pool resources are not immediately under threat, though the potential remains if the "diamond economy" ever fails. *Tobias Haller* and *Jürg Helbling* conclude with an analysis of the different case studies, in which types of conflict, ideology and power constellations are compared. The role of the State in all of these cases, and the level at which State intervention is adequate or possible, is key for protecting common pool resources in floodplains and wetlands in Africa.

Congratulations go to Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul Stern for winning the Sustainable Science Prize from the Ecological Society of America. The prize was awarded for their 2003 *Science* article, "The struggle to govern the commons." We would also like to remind you of the call for papers for the IASCP's 2006 Biennial meeting, **Survival of the Commons: Mounting Challenges and New Realities** in Bali, Indonesia. Hope to see you there. **Enjoy!**

CONTENTS	
CPR FORUM:	
Papers from the African Floodplain and Wetlands Project (AFWeP Conference)	
CPR FORUM.....	1
The AFWeP Research Project <i>Tobias Haller</i>	1
Continuity and Change in the Fisheries in Mali <i>Sabrina Beeler and Karin Frei</i>	3
CPR Institutional Change in Cameroon <i>Gilbert Fokou and Gabriela Landolt</i>	4
Ujamaa Policy and Open Access in Tanzania <i>Gimabge Mbeyale and Patrick Merok</i>	5
Institutional Change and the State in Zambia <i>Tobias Haller and Sonja Merten</i>	7
Change of CPR Management in Botswana <i>Roland Saum</i>	8
AFWeP Comparisons and Conclusions <i>Tobias Haller and Jürg Helbling</i>	9
Recent Publications	11
Announcements	14



Institutions for the Management of Common Pool Resources in African Floodplains: The AFWeP Research Project

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African floodplain wetlands are important regions for local livelihoods and are of special interest for conservation organisations such as the World Conservation Union (IUCN). These ecosystems are interesting because the inundation patterns in an otherwise semi-arid environment make them resource-rich pockets when the water recedes, in providing much sought-after resources during the dry season and between seasons. Most of the time these areas become resource rich after the water recedes. Most of the resources are Common Pool Resources (CPR) such as fish, wildlife, pasture, forests and water, which are managed through common property regimes and local institutions (rules, norms, and regulations). These institutions have been developed in pre-colonial times and were operating partly still during colonial times. Today, however, CPRs are managed by different regimes in the form of a legal pluralism but mostly controlled by the state, which has partly dismantled local rules and regulations. In many, though not all of these

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floodplains, CPRs are under pressure and there are signs of degradation: Pasture areas show signs of erosion, fish and wildlife stock are declining, and forests and water resources are less available.

At the same time, conflicts over access to resources occur in these areas, as they become more and more attractive to seasonal immigrants. These immigrants are interested in the commercial use of the CPRs and feel legitimised as citizens of the state to get access to these national resources. In order to analyse if there is a general trend in CPR management and the manner in which it is related to institutional change in Africa, a comparative research project was initiated at the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Zurich, called *African Floodplain Wetlands Project (AFWeP)* in 2002. Eight researchers from this department and from two African Universities (University of Yaoundé and University of Dar es Salaam) did fieldwork in similar floodplain ecosystems with the primary research design developed at the University of Zurich. Research concept and co-supervision of different PhDs and MAs, together with the three Universities, was done by the author. In February 2005, a conference and a workshop was held in Zurich with a view to presenting the results of the research team.

As a theoretical framework, we used the New Institutionalism in economics, anthropology and political sciences. Institutions (rules, norms and regulations) are seen as important for they structure access and use of CPRs between different actors because they make resource users and resource use predictable. The institutional approach of Elinor Ostrom (1990), served as a tool for data collection and discussion of CPR-use in the very similar ecosystems of the African floodplains. These similar ecosystems and the common-property-institutions that developed there, are interesting cases for a re-evaluation of the common property theory, on the basis of a comparative study. Such an approach is supported in the new CPR-literature. In addition, a historical approach was adopted in order to analyse the changes in local institutions and the conflicts, which are characteristic of these areas today. The research group tried to investigate how institutional change contributes to the degradation of CPRs that is taking place in many of the areas studied. Institutional changes stemming from the relations between external (economic, demographic, socio-political and technological) and internal factors of a local setting were analysed in order to determine strategies of different actors and actor groups. We also focused on bargaining power stemming from political, economic and demographic (immigration) factors and on the question of which ideologies are used in conflict situations in order to legitimise access and use of CPR. This approach is based on the work of Jean Ensminger.

The papers presented in this issue of the *Digest* are based upon presentations made during the first two days of the

African Floodplain Wetlands Project Conference formed to present the results of work on a these varying groups and floodplains.

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Please note: the majority of funding of the African researchers was done by the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North South: Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change. For more information see: <http://www.nccr-north-south.unibe.ch>, especially the individual project IP 6: Institutional Change and Livelihood Strategies, Institute of Geography, University of Zurich, Switzerland.

African Floodplain Wetlands Project Overview

Mali: Internal Niger Delta. Bozo and Somono Fishermen

Sabrina Beeler (PhD student) and Karin Frei (MA student), Dept. Of Social Anthropology

Funds: Dept of Social Anthropology, Zurich; Boral Stiftung, Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC)

Cameroon: Waza-Logone, Kotoko and div. Pastoralists

Gilbert Fokou (PhD student), University Yaounde; Gabriela Landolt (MA student), Dept of Social Anthropology, Zurich.

Funds: NCCR North South IP6

Tanzania: Pangani River Basin, Pare and Maasai

Gimbage Mbeyale (PhD Student) Uni Dar es Salaam.

Tanzania: Rufiji Floodplain, WaRufiji.

Patrick Meroka (PhD student), Dept. of Social Anthropology, Zurich.

Funds: NCCR North South, IP6

Zambia: Kafue Flats, Ila, Tonga, and Batwa.

Tobias Haller (Post-doc), Dept. of Social Anthropology, Zurich.

Funds: Swiss National Science Foundation

Botswana: Okavanga Delta, Hambukush and Baiai

Roland Saum (MA student), Dept of Social Anthropology, Zurich

Funds: Dept of Social Anthropology, Zurich.

CPR FORUM COMMENTARY

Traditional Power of the Master of the Water: Continuity and Change in the Fisheries in the Niger Inland Delta (Mali)

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In the Niger Inland Delta, an ambiguous system of rules concerning use and access to the natural resources favour a few powerful people. These people control the resources, were able to change local institutions in their favour and are profiting from them today. But unlike other case studies in this issue, profitable parts of the traditional system remain in place.

The Niger Inland Delta of Mali is a rich ecosystem, marked by a seasonal inundation of the plain. The inundation pattern deeply influences resource productivity – among the most important are fish, arable land and pastures – and resource management. For the inhabitants – whose main activity, such as fishery, agriculture or stockbreeding, is determined by their ethnic affiliation – the fluctuation of the resource availability is a factor of great uncertainty. This uncertainty causes certain strategies, like flexibility, mobility and reciprocal relations among local peoples, and a well adapted use of the resources in order to ensure the preservation of the ecosystem and hence the supply. The Niger Inland Delta is known for its resource management, which still today in certain aspects follows the Dina, a theocratic organization system created in the 19th century by the dominant ethnic group of the region, the Fulani. But they did not challenge the most ancient resource management system regarding the fishery, controlled by other ethnic groups such as the Bozo and the Somono, but integrated it into the new governance system. This system rests upon the primacy accorded to the founding lineages and their ties with the water spirits. The use of the natural resources is organised along the lines of ethno-professional specialisation. For example, the Bozo specialise in fishing shallow waters with traps, whereas the Somono specialise in fishing the main water courses of the river with big nets. The Masters of the Water play an outstanding role in this system, since they are controlling the most productive fishing grounds. People fishing these fishing grounds have to deliver the third part of the catches, called the *Manga dji*, to the Masters

During the past 60 years, considerable changes have taken place in the institutional setting of the fishing activities in the Niger Inland Delta of Mali. Political, economic, technological and climatic changes have affected the living conditions at the local level and consequently, the way fishing is carried out. The introduction of money and administrative taxes during the French colonisation, which forced the local peoples to dispose and get access to money, along with more efficient fishing equipment, better transport systems, fish storage techniques and new market possibilities facilitated the embedding of the fishery sector in the market economy. Fishing hence shifted from being an activity to meet domestic needs to being a means of satisfying cash needs, and fish became a very important export product. The productivity attracted new users, which by new state laws, were able to gain access to the fishing grounds simply through the purchase of a fishing permit, whereas before – according to the traditional management system – it hadn't been possible for them to access these resources. The aim of the new independent state (in the 1960s) to fight the traditional resource management ended in an ambiguous system of legal pluralism, in which levels of traditional and state rules are overlapping. In this environment, some individuals profit by changing or interpreting the customary and state

regulations in their favour and legitimise themselves through their positions, may these be traditional or administrative. What developed therefore are not the most efficient institutions for sustainable use but institutions which favour the interest of the most powerful individuals. They are able to legitimise themselves by making reference to the traditional or the formal system. Among the actors who gained considerably in power are many traditional Masters of the Water, who gain a lot of money through raising taxes (instead of the third part of the fish catch, the users have to pay cash to gain access to those fishing grounds) although these taxes often are illegal. In the actual situation, in which rules are very ambiguous, a sustainable use of the resources is no longer guaranteed, resulting in declining fish stocks and heightened competition over resource access and conflicts between different users.

Additionally, climatic impacts on the delta – the period of droughts during the 1970s and 1980s – led to the disappearance of major parts of wetland zones, a reduction in the fishing sites and a decrease in the duration of the inundation. Without favourable conditions, the reproduction and renewal of fish stock is reduced, and the fishermen have to intensify their fishing techniques to maintain a certain level of income.

These changes in behaviour patterns were analysed among two different ethnic groups, the Tié-Bozo and Somono fishermen, in two neighbouring fishing villages, Daga-Womina (Gomina; research site of Sabrina Beeler) and Wandiaika (research site of Karin Frei), both situated along the river Niger close to the city of Mopti, an important market centre. The two villages are of particular interest: the first is highly dependent on the latter for access to water, as the latter – being inhabited by two Masters of the Water – retains a prerogative on the water, both legal and traditional. Increasingly, strangers who can pay the Masters high sums to gain access to good fishing grounds enter the same waters which the Tié-Bozo of Gomina are fishing, sometimes pushing them out of their customary fishing grounds. This preference of rich individuals by the Masters often breaks out into conflicts, either between the rich strangers and the local fishermen, or between the Masters and the local fishermen, who – seeing others breaking the rules – often themselves do not consider the rules anymore.

These examples showed that the present institutional situation increases the bargaining power of rich individuals or of those who know how to profit from their traditional position. This results in increasing the gap between rich and poor users of the fisheries, with the latter pushed out further into marginal resource zones.

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CPR FORUM COMMENTARY

“We Have Democracy Now”: The Impact of Institutional Change on the Logone Floodplain, Cameroon

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This paper illustrates how local institutions for managing the fisheries and the pastures of the indigenous Kotoko have been eroded through political change, with more power going to seasonally immigrating nomadic and permanently immigrating ethnic group such as Arab Choa and Musgum. The Arab Choa and Musgum now claim rights to resources on the basis of democracy, enabling them, as well as the administration, to undermine the power of local stakeholders, a minority unable to control the Common Pool Resources (CPRs). Former, traditional arrangements for sharing pasture between pastoralists and fishermen, as well as the primacy of the Kotoko over fishing activity, have become ineffective.

With 11 000 km², the Logone floodplain is the second most important inland wetland of the whole African Sahel after the Niger Inner Delta. It is situated in the Lake Chad Basin and covers large territories in North Cameroon and Chad. The Cameroonian part of the floodplain is constituted of 6000 km². It is a large inundated area included between the Logone River in the East and the Waza National Park in the West. The flooding process is determined by the Logone and Chari, which constitute the two main rivers of the Lake Chad basin. Together, they represent approximately 95 per cent of the inflow to the lake. The floodplain constitutes a crossroad of many ethnic groups from diverse origins. The most important are the Kotoko specialised on fisheries considered as the owners of lands, and also nomadic pastoralists like the Choa Arabs and Musgum who use the resources (fish, pastures, lands) for their livelihood. This paper presents information from research on institutional change in two villages in the Logone floodplain (Kalkoussam and Lahaï) mainly inhabited by Kotoko. The CPRs in their area are used by all ethnic groups, however.

The Kotoko developed their natural resource management system over centuries and left their footprint in all the villages of the Waza-Logone floodplain. The original system was based on ethnic and technical restrictions to the water resources. Local authorities regulated access to fisheries according to seasons. The management of dry season reserves and digging of canals were under the responsibility of a Master of the Land whose authority was reinforced by beliefs that the resources of the floodplain belong to the *mhalaham* (Chiefs of the Water), spiritual beings capable of

providing resources and punishing wrongdoers. Nomadic pastoralists had to make arrangements with the Kotoko sultan of Logone Birni for their access to the grazing reserves of the floodplain in order to not interfere with fishing activities. Through a nomadic contract, they paid a tax in kind (*djangal*) to local authorities who then guaranteed their personal safety and access to resources. This activity was under the responsibility of the *ngalway*, a notable of the sultan in charge of pastoral affairs. Pastoralists looked after cattle of sedentary population, who relied mostly on fishing. These institutions played a key role because they limited access to resources, imposed and controlled access rules, and sanctioned abuses. However, these institutions have been gradually eroded, transformed or are in a vague



Musgum Cattle in Cameroon

form of legal pluralism and we argue that the current resource crisis in the area can partly be explained by this change. In the Cameroonian case, there are many external factors influencing this change such as climatic change and less flooding due to the Maga Dam constructed for rice irrigation, demographic pressure due to immigration, economic crisis and new political organisation (structure of the area into *departments, districts and communes*), modern infrastructures (roads) and techniques (irrigation schemes, new fishing techniques) and conservation (Waza National Park). These factors influence the availability of fish and pasture. On one side, there is decrease of resources due both to less favourable natural and man made conditions (too little water especially because of the Maga Dam, less land due to the Waza Park). On the other hand, new political structure, infrastructure and techniques have lowered access costs for external users who, due to the economic crisis, see fish and cattle as valuable sources as do locals. But while local rules have been dismantled, bureaucratic institutions imposed by the State failed to put in place mechanisms of management, monitoring and sanctioning. Therefore, a clear authority is lacking. Most of the resources are increasingly under open access or privatisation. Newcomers such as Musgum and Choa Arabs have gained more bargaining power and impose new regulations. They use the argument that with democracy, the majority (now mostly Musgum) determines how fish and other resources are used. Moreover, state officials are trying to generate profit for themselves and help powerful resource users have open access to CPRs.

The pressure on resources of the floodplain have been increasing and can be illustrated by the escalation of conflicts over natural resources, which have taken an ethnic shape; for example, the Musgum no longer wait to fish areas

controlled by the Kotoko. Another feature is the increase of profitable traditional fishing techniques such as the canals, which can be made now without problems and indicate the collapse of traditional management regimes. Pressure is rising in some groups with open access; in others, groups with high bargaining power claim exclusive rights. Both situations lead to more conflicts in the Logone floodplain. Often, these conflicts are not challenged by the authorities and some are even provoked intentionally by farmers,

fishermen and by local administrators with personal profit in mind; a destroyed channel, a field or local infrastructure by nomads leads to compensation claims by Musgum or Kotoko. From such claims local administrators also profit as adjudicator. One

important aspect is that the democratisation and decentralisation of the administration radically changed the traditional hierarchies within the Kotoko society and between the Kotoko as traditional leaders, nomadic pastoralists such as Arab Choa and the immigrants like the Musgum. In their own view, Kotoko rules are only valid for Kotoko. This new perception was based on the notion of “democracy” which means for them the freedom to feel at home wherever they are and also the opportunity to use the resources as they please. In the same way, nomadic pastoralists paying taxes to the state do not see why they shall be put under local rules since they consider “they have bought the floodplain” and in their eyes, they can use pastures for free access.

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CPRFORUM COMMENTARY

Ujamaa Policy and Open Access in Pangani River Basin and Rufiji Floodplain, Tanzania

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The Rufiji Floodplain and the Pangani River Basin of Same district in Tanzania are two river floodplains with ecologically varied settings and economies. They share, however, the common political experience of Ujamaa after independence, which opened up Common Pool Resources (CPR) for all Tanzanians.

The Rufiji Floodplain is home to the largest river in Tanzania and has been a remote area, where CPRs such as fish, wildlife and other resources have been used by different ethno-professional groups collectively called Rufiji. Membership to fishing, hunting, agricultural and gathering groups defined resource areas and access to CPRs according to flooding seasons. Within these groups, local leaders (Mpindo) set up rules and had religious specialists to co-ordinate collective use of CPR, monitoring and sanctioning. Wild animal attack (crocodiles, lions) was viewed as a clear sign of having violated rules.

The Pangani River Basin of Same District is not only a floodplain setting. The Pare ethnic group in the mountains adjacent to the plains was using CPRs such as water and forests. The floodplains on the other hand were used by nomadic pastoralists (Maasai) for dry season grazing. In the Pangani area, village settings and boundaries included whole mountain slopes with water catchment areas covered by forests, where the Supreme Being was seen to be located and rituals were performed. These territories were extending according to slopes and small waters. Therefore the management of irrigation water to the floodplain and protection of catchment areas was done within one ecological setting. Access to these resources was governed by local leaders called Mfumwa and elders.

During German, and especially during British, rule Native Authorities were set up and taxes were introduced in order to push people to produce cash crops. This affected the two environments differently: While Rufiji area benefited from its remoteness, the Pangani basin area was exposed to a stronger colonial control and was more involved in cash crop production (coffee, especially in the mountains). After independence, Tanzania adopted a socialistic policy (Socialism and self-reliance) namely Ujamaa (family hood) in 1967. This was accompanied by transformation of the colonial and traditional institutions with the main objective to give all Tanzanian in a one-party state a chance to take active role in development. The main aspect of Ujamaa concentrated on the dismantling of ethnic boundaries and alteration of traditional or colonial political structures to create room for state villages. In the case of Rufiji floodplain, new villages were created on higher grounds for protection against floods. The mountain villages in Pangani remained, but the political structure was altered. The major impact of Ujamaa policy was that traditional institutions had been altered by forced relocation and the restructuring of existing villages. This can be seen on an organisational and a spatial

level. Local traditional and colonially transformed traditional leadership offices (the Mpindo for the Rufiji and the Mfumwa in the Pangani Basin), along with the council of elders, were abolished because these leaders were seen as a threat for national unity and the villagisation projects. These were replaced by the village chairmen who took over all the administration functions at the village level backed by district government. Secondly, the ethnic boundaries stopped to exist and this created an open access constellation in Rufiji. In Pangani Basin the boundaries were disrupted because new village territories were no longer outlined according to

environmental slope boundaries. In Rufiji area this restructuring disrupted the traditional management institutions and granted free access for newcomers through the possession of state permits, which the district government issued. This made it difficult for the locals to access the CPRs leading to illegal resource poaching at the local level for fish and wildlife.

One of the main problems now is that formal state rules cannot be implemented due lack of financial means after Structural Adjustment Programmes. At the same time, more people are interested in the CPR in Rufiji area since it has been opened up through infrastructure and because commercial centres are within reach. However, there are

differences according to resources and how close villages are from urban centres. Regarding fish in Rufiji, the management of floodplain-related small lakes was made difficult by the influx of seasonal fishermen in a village close to the market centre Ikwiriri. People in another village were able to re-introduce certain traditional and new regulations because their village is located further away from the market centre. But it is not only a problem between outsiders and locals: within villages close to markets, young people have also started to use CPRs for commercial purposes in an uncontrolled way. Interestingly, there is an emerging opposition: parts of the old management system are gaining value after accidents with crocodiles and lions are occurring, especially among elders. Such events are said to be signs of punishment from spirits who are angry because of the misuse of CPRs.

In the Pangani Basin area most severely affected, state development, cash crop production (coffee) and the change in agrarian Ujamaa policy towards more liberalisation and privatisation, has lead to a change from coffee production to more extensive resource use. These changes are due to low coffee prices paid to peasants and weakened cooperative



Hope to see you there! Details on page 15.

unions. Forests in the hands of the State in catchment areas are now an alternative (though illegal) and are being used for commercial lumbering by local Pare because the state does not protect the forests adequately. Other Pare people move into the floodplains in order to practice irrigation agriculture (rice). Irrigation has been practiced mainly at the foot of the mountains along the floodplain for some time, but modern irrigation schemes were introduced 1990s. These were not adapted to local conditions and plots are taken over more and more by rich urban people and administrators. In one of the two floodplains, irrigation agriculture is rather new and conflicts with pastoralists already pushed aside by a protected area.

While the overuse of CPRs are increasing with these changes, there are some positive signs of collective action: Now there is a new Government Act (following the Village Land Act of 1999) granting villages the right to manage the resources within the villages collectively. Though this gives power back to the local level, it will not be enough to challenge the problems of inter village dynamics or between villagers and outsiders. Also, the weakness of the State must be considered. In the Rufiji area, there are signs of collective action for fishing in remote areas where locals share common interests and old rules have remained longer as a focal point. Moreover, there is an initiative financed by the NCCR North South in collaboration with IUCN Tanzania (partly based on the former Rufiji Environment Management Project (REMP)) in order to strengthen the building of new local level institutions in the forms of locally defined by-laws. In Pangani basin, the Pare peasants at the foot of the mountain have realised that logging in catchment areas is problematic for them because of the lack of water. One local initiative is attempting to reintroduce the old management system in a dialog with the upstream villages in order to protect the forest areas.

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CPR FORUM COMMENTARY

Opening Up the CPRs: Institutional Change and the State in Kafue Flats, Zambia

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Common Pool Resource (CPR) Management among the Ila, Balundwe-Tonga and Batwa in the Kafue Flats is an example of how the State has intervened with locally developed institutions for the management of fisheries, wildlife and pasture and how it has created open access situations. Local stakeholders would like to re-establish old

rules or new regulations but outsiders consider that, as Zambians, they are allowed by the state to get access under formal laws. But the State is absent when it comes to the enforcement of these laws.

We are sitting in a traditional house of a Ila/Balundwe chief in the Kafue Flats, a floodplain of about 6,500 km² in the Southern Province of Zambia. The area had once been rich in fish, wildlife and pasture. Now the situation is different: local people are facing a food crisis. We are here to see one of the chiefs because we want to explain to him our research objectives. We would like to know more about old institutions governing CPRs, especially fish, wildlife and pasture, and how they have changed. As we finish the Chief stands up: "Please wait here for me", he says and leaves the room. After two minutes he returns, holding a piece of black cloth in his hands. "There are people from other areas of the country coming here and fish with this kind of net in the Kafue area. We cannot do anything!" During our research it becomes clear that people from the Fishery Department cannot interfere because they do not have transportation. This is the classic situation in the Kafue Flats today, which is inhabited by the transhumant Ila and Balundwe pastoralists (also practising agriculture), Batwa fishermen, and now also by Tonga peasants in the South and Lozi commercial fishermen in the North.

The economy of the Ila and Balundwe is mostly based on cattle, which is also the foundation of their identity. Nevertheless, agriculture, fishing and hunting are important. They are organised in territorial areas (*chichi*) and were historically living in fenced big villages with big-man like headmen as a protection against slave raiding groups (Lozi-Kingdom). Access to CPRs such as pasture, fish and wildlife was embedded in the local traditional land tenure system: All the resources in such a territory were CPRs under the spiritual ownership of a headman or several headmen. In the territory Mbeza (Chiefdom Nalubamba), where the main research took place, the first ones to settle in the area were the Batwa (resembling the San), who stayed on the levies at the Kafue River and control the fisheries (river sections). Fishing in breeding season of spawning places of bream fish and use of nets were not allowed and rituals had to be performed for fishing. According to the Batwa, not respecting such rules would make ancestral spirits angry: spirits would either not let out fish or attack by crocodiles or hippos. In the 18th and 19th centuries, cattle herding groups began immigrating. The first of these immigrants - an Ila man - intermarried with the Batwa and started to control the best pasture and hunting grounds in the area as well as fishing grounds. After a series of conflicts, regulations were set whereby access to pasture, fish and wildlife was controlled. Only members of an area could get access to cattle camps. Fishing was based on clear regulations adapted to flooding patterns. Collective fishing in tributaries especially was monitored by ritual supervisors (*utamba*), responsible for

sections of tributaries of the Kafue River, and organising collective use of ponds. Hunting was done collectively (so called *chila* hunting) whereby hunting days were set and monitored. For both activities neighbouring villages were invited based on the rules of reciprocity.

During colonial times, the British took over the administration of Northern Rhodesia from the British South Africa Company and started to introduce formal laws. In the early post-colonial days (1964), major institutional settings were taken over from the British by the independent Zambian Government under Kenneth Kaunda. The economy was largely built on copper sales. For copper and industrial production, energy was needed and dams were built at the Kafue River for hydropower production in the 1970s. These dams changed the flooding patterns considerably. After drastic reduction of prices in copper since 1975, and political changes in 1991, privatisation schemes were introduced. But the country still faces a huge debt and has to fulfil requirements of structural adjustment programmes.

All these developments led to the dismantling of local CPR institutions: The British opened up the fisheries in 1930 for immigrant fishermen (Lozi and Bemba) against the will of the Batwa. After a massive decline in catch at the end of the 1950s, new rules were introduced and by the State such as mesh sizes, closing times, licences, and the control of river sections of Districts (80 km length) and enforced by the Department of Fisheries. *Chila* hunting was forbidden by the end of colonial times. Licences, too expensive for locals to obtain, were introduced and hunting was only allowed with guns. A large area was transformed into a Game Management Area (GMA) and National Parks (such as Lochinvar) were set up. Land and pasture was still governed under the local customary law managed by headmen.

CPR problems have now emerged because the State claiming to control CPRs does not have the economic resources to monitor and sanction CPR usage. Adding to this, unemployed citizens all over the country are interested in the extraction of CPRs, leading to an open access situation in the area especially for fish and wildlife. The Department of Fisheries does not have adequate financial means for transportation and so the large seasonal fishing camps and fisheries in the tributaries cannot be controlled. Therefore, fishing takes place all year round and forbidden techniques are used (mosquito nets, shed cloth, generally nets with too little mesh sizes, etc.). In the tributary areas, collective fishing rules are not respected by young men while women lose more and more the possibility to get access to fish. Less money for wildlife protection due to the privatisation of Wildlife Department also leads to less possibilities for monitoring. Salaries are not paid regularly for lengthy periods and scouts are said to be corrupt, making deals with outside poachers. Pasture is reduced due to less flooding resulting from dams. As the area gets dryer, the woodland encroaches into the pastures in the flats. Outsiders and absentee herd owners become interested in the area and powerful local leaders want to

privatise pasture because now they can get leasehold titles. So, one is faced with privatisation on one hand (reducing the area for other local pasture users), with open access for wealthier cattle owners on the other. All of these developments lead to a series of conflicts between local people, external fishermen, poachers and game scouts as well between cattle owners and people wanting to use the flats for agriculture. In most of the cases, outsiders have greater bargaining power than locals. In the fisheries, this leads the locals to blame the immigrant ethnic groups for their problems. Generally, locals are not just against outsiders as old reciprocity rules show, but against “newcomers who just fish anyhow.”

This is a classic example because it shows how total State involvement disconnects local people from CPRs and when the State’s institutions are not robust, open access and privatisation constellations occur. Use and management of CPRs are in the hands of outsiders who claim to have access rights because they are citizens of the state. They can misuse this ideology because the state is absent. In order to reintroduce local power there are attempts based on local initiatives in collaboration with the local Department of Fisheries. A pilot project for the development of local by-laws (in addition to the national fisheries law) has been started now based on local demands and on our research results. The project is financed by the World Fish Center (a CGIAR organisation). The aim is to help mitigate these problems by establishing a locally crafted co-management system of CPRs.

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CPR FORUM COMMENTARY

Looking for the Tourists: Institutional Change of CPR Management in Botswana’s Okavango Delta

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The Okavango Delta is known for its tourist potential and its untouched nature. Interestingly, Common Pool Resources (CPRs) in this area are not under pressure in the same way as the other cases presented. Although there are plenty of resources, local “bushmen” and pastoral groups are waiting for their gains under the new regime of the Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). They depend mostly on money from the State stemming from exports of diamonds.

During the preparation for this research project, the focus was on institutional change and resource degradation. But fieldwork in Ikoga, a small village of agro-pastoral farmers and fishermen in the Upper part of Botswana’s Okavango Delta, revealed that there were no severe conflicts over the delta’s common pool resources (CPRs) such as wildlife, fish, pasture and gathering

resources and also that none of these CPRs were overused. This is interesting because depletion of, and conflicts over, natural CPRs, mostly grazing areas under open access tenure, have been a serious problem in other parts of the country in the past. But how can this be when people with different ethnic background and resource use patterns claim access for fish, pastures, and veld products that are nowadays in most cases under open access tenure?

Three interrelated factors seem to be responsible for the current social and ecological stability in the research area compared to the other case studies: a low population density, the government's distribution of goods and money (social welfare system), and the absence of markets and demand for products of the research area. The low population density reduces the pressure on the CPRs in a subsistence economy that is largely based on natural CPRs. The government's supply of goods and services covers some of the most basic needs of the people who would otherwise be forced to exploit the CPRs more intensively. And the absence of regional and national markets together with a low demand for local CPRs on the national and international markets make commercial exploitation not (yet) profitable. In addition, the diamond driven economy offers opportunities for jobs in the urban centres.

Policy makers and development agencies agree that this rather positive situation will not necessarily remain forever, especially if the conditions for the "diamond economy" worsen once socioeconomic or political factors change. A popular development and conservation approach called Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) has thus been adopted in Botswana. Under CBNRM both, economic development and conservation is sought to be achieved by involving communities such as Ikoga into the management of wetland resources that have economic potential. The management of parts of the Delta is thus partially and temporarily transferred from the government to local communities or community based organisations (CBOs). These CBOs usually sublease "their" area to a professional tourist operator who, accordingly to the deal (defined in a management plan) must share his profits with the CBOs who in turn must cut back on agricultural, fishing, and gathering activities in the areas that are reserved for tourism. But will the profits from the deal with outside entrepreneurs outweigh the costs from the reduced access to natural CPRs and will the people really stay away from exploiting the CPRs?

People are easier to convince to enter into such agreements when they have no real alternatives. Well-approved subsistence and agricultural techniques have eroded over time due to tough climatic conditions. The negative impacts of government measures like labour market-oriented education, by strict hunting regulations, and by limitations on cattle meat trade escorted by cattle eradication programmes and continuous food handouts are also felt. The difficulty to receive land tenure rights to establish commercial activities and the uncertainty of legal land tenure rights for agricultural plots near and within the delta are preventing peoples' economic perspectives from going beyond

tourism. Since most of the Delta's areas are in one way or another already part of profitable sightseeing programmes and photographic and hunting safaris, locals might look forward to take part in an economic segment that can also generate income for them in one way or another. Many people believe that at least some will find jobs nearby, and that the lodges might increase demand for local products such as fish or handicrafts.

But these perspectives also contain potential sources of conflicts. How, for example, is the rent from the lease distributed within the community? Who will get the jobs at the lodges and who can sell his or her products there? Since only the winners of the new situation will be defending the new regulations, friction is likely to arise between them and the tourist operators (and tourists) on one side and those local resource users who have to switch to more marginal resource areas, the losers, on the other. The narrow focus on tourist activities also limits the range of the people's economic activities and the communities' freedom of choice. New rules defined in management plans are accepted by the communities while others have been made superfluous by the Government's transformation of former common property regimes into open access tenure. Institutional changes are thus not only the result of economic change, but also largely from government action.

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CPR FORUM COMMENTARY

Disputing African Floodplains: Comparison and Conclusions from AFWeP Case Studies

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The AFWeP conference papers show that Common Pool Resources have been managed primarily by institutions developed by local ethnic groups: concepts of territoriality had developed already in pre-colonial times, often linked with specific techniques. Ethno-professional groups have been the basis of the institutional set up defining where fisher groups, pastoralists and hunters were entitled to use which resource during what time in a season. This is the case in Mali where the Bozo and the Somono fishermen as well as the nomadic pastoralist groups had their specific space of resource use according to technique and season. The same is true for the different ethnic groups in the Rufiji area and for local groups in the Okavango Delta. In other areas, such as Cameroon and Zambia, one finds indigenous groups establishing resource rights under villages and more or less centralised regimes. In many of the cases, religious ideology was an important aspect in the customary institutional set up: First-comers mostly established a kind of spiritual ownership over the CPRs, which is still seen in parts of the researched areas as the legitimacy behind CPR usage and regulation. Interestingly,

many of the traditional access rules do not exclude outsiders but regulate the conditions under which they are given and open the way for reciprocity. Another important aspect is that local institutions have not been developed in order to protect nature but rather solve co-ordination problems, formalise access rights under dynamic conditions and try to restrain use for better gains (i.e. waiting to fish out ponds in order to have bigger fish). Therefore, at best, conservation might be a non-intended by-product of specific constellations of resource users.

The institutional changes in these areas are linked to political and economic developments in international markets and at the national level: After independence most of these countries, irrespective of who their colonial rulers had been, had the same background: the State claimed CPRs as its own property. Formal law regulated CPRs, and by issuing permits and licences and by establishing game reserves and national parks, gave more control to powerful outsiders who were able to influence the state actors. In addition, it must be stressed that environmental changes affecting institutional change also stem from technological and infrastructural developments in these areas: Since independence, floodplains are used to generate hydropower and to introduce large-scale irrigation programmes. In most of the cases, people are affected in one or another way by these changes as they alter water availability and inundation patterns.

In four out of the five countries studied, however, the State's ability to control CPRs is weakening as it battles with severe debt crises and adjustment programmes because export prices have declined in the last 10 to 20 years. Therefore, State revenue is decreasing, resulting in reduced capacity to finance the control of CPRs. Less control, as well as increasing poverty, are making the use of CPRs more attractive because it is less expensive to get access and their relative price (compared to other goods) is rising. What people are facing then are open access constellations in which the politically stronger individuals and outsiders get the biggest share, fish with forbidden gear, do not accept closing times for fishing and for hunting, ignore rules of access to pasture and cut timber without restrictions. Less powerful actors are the losers or are forced to use the CPRs even more intensively and to start diversifying their livelihood strategies. Differences in bargaining power for CPR access are legitimised by different ideologies used to justify open access to or privatisation of CPRs: Outsiders coming into the area argue that they are citizens of the state and, in a democratic setting, cannot be denied access, even if they do not follow the rules of the state (except Botswana).

The major problem in this context is that the state is present ideologically but absent practically, unable to monitor and prevent misuse of CPRs. This constellation has been called "the present-absence of the state". On the other hand, some local powerful actors try to keep, revitalise or transform some of the traditional institutions because these rules give them power and access to CPRs for commercial reasons. These can be constellations in which stakeholders make reference to the old tenure system, which they have transformed, in order to be able to harness all the profit (for example, Masters of the Water in Mali, supporter of a headman giving out cattle camps in Zambia). Or, for example, through

accidents with hippopotamuses and crocodiles, the old view of the powerless, that the spiritual world is not happy with the situation, can be revitalised (Rufiji in Tanzania, Zambia).

But this latter view strengthens the local actors only temporally and does not change the main political context or the position otherwise. Therefore, in some areas not only open access constellation, but as well as privatisation, occurs, through which we are faced with the tragedy of the former commoners (Zambia, Tanzania, Mali, Cameroon). In many of the cases, State administrators, who are not well paid, play a crucial role by profiting from the more powerful resource users and therefore helping them to gain open access to CPRs. Game scouts, fishery and forestry officers as well as village governments imposed by the State make CPRs part of their livelihoods by profiting from trade network of game, fish and timber and extracting a kind of "rent" (Mali, Cameroon, Zambia, Tanzania). More concretely, in Cameroon, administrators are not interested in solving conflicts between sedentary fishermen, agriculturalists and pastoralists. On the contrary, they have an interest in increasing conflicts because they are able to charge the ones they declare guilty and profit from those they declare the victims.

In all of the areas studied, there are different levels of conflicts, which break out because CPRs are diminishing or their availability is not secured. Such conflicts can be minor but can escalate and become violent. Sometimes they can take an ethnic shape (Zambia, Cameroon). But scarce resources and conflicts are also a chance. In the pre-colonial times the emergence of some institutions could be traced back to conflicts and conflict resolution. The case studies show that even today some of the first signs of collective action and self-organisation of interest groups emerge from problems (Tanzania, Zambia), and we tried to explore the conditions under which such local initiatives can be successful. This does not mean that the state does not play a major role in the management of CPRs but the question remains, at which level state intervention is adequate and possible. In some countries, a participatory approach of co-management is used by the governments and by NGOs, which mostly fails because the state and NGOs often do not understand local political settings and the political and economic interests of all the stakeholders. Nevertheless, "what are good conditions for co-management?" must be debated.

During the workshop, it became clear that the major exception is the Botswana case because of its strong national economy: Botswana generates enough revenue to redistribute locally and nationally. Neither locals, nor newcomers, are interested in CPR-extraction for commercial reasons. Differences of external factors seem to be very important. However, it will be the differences in national and internal factors between the other case studies, which will allow the team to define conditions conducive for collective action either for developing new institutions or for maintaining old ones. A first step in the comparison has been taken up at the workshop by defining basic issues for comparison and by analysing the types of conflict, ideology used and power constellations in all the cases. The team plans to contribute major conclusions for development and conflict resolution issues in Africa.

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For questions about IASCP papers and research contact Charlotte Hess, Information Officer, IASCP, 513 N. Park, Bloomington, IN 47408 USA iascp@indiana.edu Tel: 01-812-855-9636 Fax:: 01-812-855-3150

Nominations for 2006 IASCP Officers

Nominations for the 2006 election of President-elect and Executive Council will soon begin. Ballots will be sent to membership in early 2006. Members will vote for President-elect and two Executive Council members.

According to IASCP bylaws, candidates may be nominated for elected offices upon written petition from one percent of the membership. Candidates must be eligible for office, members in good standing, and have given written consent to the nomination to the President. The President must receive such nominations no later than four months before the General Meeting.

Nominations may be emailed **no later than February 15 2006** to any member of the Nominating Committee:

Susan Hanna, Chair	susan.hanna@oregonstate.edu
Rucha Ghate	ghates_ngp@sancharnet.in
Isilda Nhantumbo	isildan.iucn@tvcabo.co.mz
Calvin Nhira	calvinnhira@yahoo.com
Dianne Rocheleau	DRocheleau@clarku.edu

CONGRATULATIONS

to

Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul Stern
Winners of the **Ecological Society of America**
Sustainability Science Prize

The reviewers noted that "the authors provide a suite of testable requirements for adaptive commons governance in complex systems, thus setting the stage for new and innovative research in the field of sustainability science." They also added that, "this is noteworthy because it shows that ecologists are increasingly aware of the significance of common property theory in addressing ecologically important issues. The fact that all three authors came to the annual meeting of the Ecological Society to accept the prize demonstrates that there is enthusiasm among both common property theorists and ecologists for developing closer collaborations."

Check it Out!

Dietz, T., E. Ostrom, and P. C. Stern. 2003 "The struggle to govern the commons." *Science* 302:1907-1912.

Call for Papers (Full call on Page 19)
The Eleventh Biennial Global Conference of
The International Association for the Study of
Common Property

Survival of the Commons: Mounting Challenges &
New Realities
June 19 – June 23, 2006
Bali, Indonesia

Abstract Submission Guidelines

A panel, paper, or poster abstracts of 500 words, or less, should be submitted in word or word perfect format, as an e-mail attachment, to the conference secretariat at: iascp06@indiana.edu, by **November 15, 2005**.

The following form MUST accompany your abstract submission:

IASCP 2006 Abstract Submission Form

Surname First Name
 Mailing Address Country
 Email
 Phone Number Fax Number
 Funding Needed(Indicate Yes or No)

Indicate theme if applicable

The conference secretariat will notify individuals of acceptance by January 15, 2006. The final papers should be submitted by April 15, 2006.

Panel proposals are limited to 2-4 papers (max. 4). Panel proposals should include an abstract and abstract submission form for each paper.

Funding for Participants The FORD Foundation, IDRC, and the Christensen Fund have supported travel to past IASCP conferences. We are hopeful that they will be able to partially fund a small number of conference participants at IASCP2006.

Please indicate on your abstract submission form if you will need partial funding to attend the conference.

Visit www.iascp.org for information regarding Multiple Submission Guidelines and for the full announcement.

Contact Information:

IASCP2006 Conference Committee
 Email: iascp06@indiana.edu
 Website: <http://www.iascp.org>



Conference Sub-themes

- 1.1 Contemporary analytical tools and theoretical questions
- 1.2 Conservation policy and the commons
- 1.3 Culture, identity, and survival of the commons
- 1.4 Local resource rights and management institutions
- 1.5 New frontiers (the new global commons)
- 1.6 Privatization
- 1.7 Resurgent commons within public or private property
- 1.8 The commons and the fate of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries
- 1.9 The state, legal reform, and decentralization

Special Panel Series: “The International Journal of the Commons”

A selection of papers presented at this series of panels will be published in the very first issue of the “International Journal of the Commons,” January 2007. Papers that provide an update of findings related to fisheries, irrigation systems, pastoral systems, digital commons, and forestry would be of major assistance in helping summarize for all of us where we are. Synthesis articles on the impact of the size of a group, its heterogeneity, the kinds of rules in use, the level of governance arrangements, and other major issues are also encouraged.

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Renew your membership now and you will not miss any of your membership benefits; including: subscriptions to The CPR Digest; discount registration at our nearly annual meetings; conference abstracts, and the opportunity to contribute to the growth of the IASCP. Contact the IASCP office for additional information or visit our web site.

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continued from page 14

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CPR FORUM PHOTO GALLERY



Right: Kotoko woman; Man with traditional dress



Above, from left: Pastoralists; Kotoko fish trap



Right: Arab Choa Girl; Man from Kafue Flats; Pastoralists (below)



Call for Papers
The Eleventh Biennial Global Conference of
The International Association for the Study of Common Property
(IASCP)

Survival of the Commons: Mounting Challenges & New Realities
June 19 – June 23, 2006
Bali, Indonesia

About IASCP

The IASCP is an association devoted to bringing together a group of international and interdisciplinary researchers, practitioners, and policymakers for the purpose of fostering better understanding, improvements, and sustainable solutions for environmental, electronic, and other types of shared resource that is a commons or common-pool resource.



- To foster the development of expertise in the field of agrarian studies.
- To foster the cooperation between national as well as international institutions

Conference Host

The official conference host will be The Center for Agrarian Studies (Pusat Kajian Agraria, or PKA) of the Bogor Agricultural University (Institut Pertanian Bogor, or IPB), Indonesia. IPB is the largest and oldest agricultural university in Indonesia, and is situated in Bogor, West Java, and 60 kilometers south of the capital, Jakarta. PKA was established in December 1999 as the newest in a suite of research institutes at IPB. The Center is devoted to the study of agrarian questions in support of the agrarian reform process in Indonesia. The Center's staff and directors include many of Indonesia's foremost scholars in the field of agrarian research. PKA-IPB's leadership includes:

The Center's goals are:

- To promote the development of policies in agrarian and related fields in support of a balanced fulfilment of the state's as well as community-wide interests.
- To provide references and recommendations through studies of agrarian problems and issues.

Conference Chairperson and Organizing Committee

Conference Chairperson: Ernan Rustiadi, Director of the Center for Regional Development Planning
Co-chairperson: Satyawan Sunito, Executive Secretary of the Center for Agrarian Studies.
Organizing Committee: Moira Moeliono: CIFOR
Hery Purnomo: CIFOR
Soeryo Ariwibowo: Environmental Study Centre (PSL-IPB)
Martua Sirait: ICRAF
Indriatmo Soetarto: ICRAF
Damayanti Buchori: Faculty of Agriculture, IPB
Craig Thorburn: Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

Why Indonesia?

In Indonesia, common property has a rich and diverse history. The rich biological and cultural diversity of the archipelagic nation is mirrored by the variety of social institutions associated with natural resource ownership and management. Much of the country's forest, river and coastal and marine territories and resources have been collectively managed by local communities for many

generations. Like elsewhere in the world, globalization and modernization have led to fundamental changes in the way common property is understood and practiced in Indonesia. The legal framework inherited from the colonial period, and reinforced by global market forces, provides almost no space for common or communal property. Imbalanced distribution of wealth and power, demographic pressures and internecine strife weaken and undermine existing institutions and practices. Recent political and economic shocks present new challenges and opportunities for communities and individuals. The new national water resources law, with its emphasis on privatization and rationalization, is one example of the profound changes taking place in the country.

Indonesia will thus provide an interesting backdrop for the IASCP2006, where local and international participants can use the opportunity to explore, analyze, discuss and articulate issues of common property practices and institutions, and compare local and regional experiences with research from around the world. For IASCP, a conference in Indonesia will provide the opportunity to mobilize alumni and to increase its membership in Indonesia and the Asia Pacific region as a whole. As well, such conference is an opportunity to reach out to scholars and practitioners of the region, who have been left out or only loosely linked to the IASCP network and its products.

For Indonesia, holding the IASCP conference will help highlight issues that until recently were too politically sensitive to discuss. It will help reach influential policy-makers, the public and media and thereby support the cause of bringing back the commons to the people. In Indonesia's changing sociopolitical, any endeavors that call attention to natural resource management and property rights issues are beneficial.

Bali as conference venue

About the theme

Recent IASCP conferences have highlighted globalization and its challenges. For the 2006 conference, the committee sought a theme that emphasizes issues of importance to Indonesian communities and policy-makers, but that also encompasses supranational topics and concerns. Internationally emphasis has shifted to new arenas of innovation and contestation and new institutional forms— such as the virtual commons, the ownership of ideas and information, and global commons. In the case of Indonesia, the issue of survival and adaptation are of highest importance. The organizing

committee proposes the following conference theme and sub-themes:

Conference theme: Survival of the Commons: Mounting Challenges & New Realities

Conference Sub-themes

- 1.1 Contemporary analytical tools and theoretical questions
- 1.2 Conservation policy and the commons
- 1.3 Culture, identity, and survival of the commons
- 1.4 Local resource rights and management institutions
- 1.5 New frontiers (the new global commons)
- 1.6 Privatization
- 1.7 Resurgent commons within public or private property
- 1.8 The commons and the fate of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries
- 1.9 The state, legal reform, and decentralization

Special Panel Series: “The International Journal of the Commons”

In addition to the above themes, a set of panels will focus on an effort to provide an excellent synthesis of where we stand in regard to core theoretical issues and/or specific substantive concerns related to a particular sector. A selection of papers presented at this series of panels will be published in January of 2007 in the very first issue of the “International Journal of the Commons”. This is the new journal that IASCP plans to start publishing in 2007. The inaugural issue will provide an overview of where we have come in our understanding of key theoretical and policy issues in the study of the commons. Papers that provide an update of findings related to fisheries, irrigation systems, pastoral systems, digital commons, and forestry would be of major assistance in helping summarize for all of us where we are. This would be particularly important for students who wish to gain a good overview before they start their own research. Synthesis articles on the impact of the size of a group, its heterogeneity, the kinds of rules in use, the level of governance arrangements, and other major issues are also encouraged.

Guidelines for the abstract submissions

We invite anyone interested in the survival of the commons to participate in the conference. We encourage researchers and practitioners to submit proposals for a panel, individual paper, or poster presentation. The panel, paper, or poster abstracts of **500 words**, or less, should be submitted in word or

word perfect format to the conference secretariat at: iascp06@indiana.edu, by **November 15, 2005**.

Please send a Word or Word-Perfect file as an e-mail attachment **ALONG WITH THE FOLLOWING FORM:**

IASCP 2006 Abstract Submission Form

Surname

First Name

Mailing Address

Country

Email

Phone Number

Fax Number

Funding Needed(Indicate Yes or No)

Indicate theme if applicable

The above form **MUST** accompany your abstract submission

An international committee of commons researchers and practitioners will review all abstracts. Abstracts are accepted based on quality and appropriateness to the conference. Interested participants are encouraged to submit an abstract on their topic of expertise that will be suitable for discussion and debate, even if it does not necessarily fit in the stated conference sub-themes.

The conference secretariat will notify individuals of acceptance by **January 15, 2006**. The final papers should be submitted by **April 15, 2006**.

The committee requests that panel proposals are limited to 2-4 papers (maximum 4). Panel proposals should include an abstract and abstract submission form for each paper. Funding for panel proposals will be considered in the same group as paper presentations and considered according to individual abstracts in each panel proposal.

Funding for Participants

In the past, we have only been able to fund a limited number of participants so strongly encourage all persons to seek independent funding. The FORD Foundation, IDRC, and the Christensen Fund have supported travel to past IASCP conferences. We are hopeful that they will be able to partially fund a small number of conference participants at IASCP2006. Please indicate on your abstract submission form if you will need partial funding to attend the conference.

Multiple Submission Guidelines

In order to keep the participation at the conference as wide as possible, the program co-chairs discourage multiple submissions for single-authored paper/poster presentation. Most professional associations and funding agencies require that a person present a paper/poster at the meeting. Allowing multiple single-authored paper/poster presentations by one person would reduce the possibility for other participants to obtain funding to attend the conference. Therefore, the program committee will follow the below guidelines regarding multiple submissions:

- We CANNOT accept two or more single authored papers from the same person;
- We CANNOT accept more than two papers that have the same author as one of the co-authors;
- An author presenting a paper at a panel CANNOT be the discussant for the same panel; and
- An author presenting a paper at a panel CAN chair a panel.

*Please note the following exception. Individuals who submit abstracts for themes 1.1 – 1.9 may also submit a separate abstract for the special panel series on the “International Journal of the Commons”. Please indicate on the abstract submission form if you are submitting an abstract for the special panel series.

Contact Information:
IASCP2006 Conference Committee
Email: iascp06@indiana.edu
Website: <http://www.iascp.org>

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